Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World

By Gerd Gigerenzer. 2000

845 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a08c55c713917aadfb1687a76853fe7245acd1ca

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Citations in the corpus

Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection (2013, background): “If we imagine that socially adaptive pressures will favor reasoning styles that maximize this form of “expressive utility” (Gigerenzer, 2000), we might, on this account, expect the use of more effortful, System 2 forms of information processing to magnify, not mitigate, ideological differences.”
Re-engaging with rationality in economic geography: behavioural approaches and the importance of context in decision-making (2007, background): “Presumed universality leads to binary characterisations of irrational (bad) behaviour and rational (good) behaviour based on the rules of individual maximisation, ignoring the social context on which normative validity in fact depends (Gigerenzer, 2000).”
Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment (2008, background): “Relying on affect may be a heuristic, but as Gigerenzer (2002) argues, in many domains, heuristics are not error-prone shortcuts because there is no known reasoning process that will give a better answer.”
Pragmatic solutions to offender profiling and behavioural investigative advice (2010, unknown): “…terms of cognitive processing, it is known that experts, compared to novices, are able to integrate and process complex information into meaningful chunks, (Chase & Simon, 1973), ignore more information than do novices (Gigerenezer, 2000) and can (Militello, Hutton, Pliske, Knight, & Klein, 1997).”
Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance: The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (2005, background): “…on the particular environment through which se- 10See, for example, Barkow et al. (1992), Pinker (1993, 1997), Crawford and Krebs (1998), Buss (1999), Gigerenzer (2000), and the emerging literature in “evolutionary psychology”, which is reviewed in detail in the recent text by Barrett, Dunbar, and…”
Speed/Accuracy Trade-Off between the Habitual and the Goal-Directed Processes (2011, background): “The answer given to this dilemma in social science is often based on a variety of domainspecific heuristic methods [59,60] in which, rather than employing a general-purpose optimizer, animals use a set of simple and hardcoded rules to make their decisions in each particular situation.”
Linking Risk Messages to Information Seeking and Processing (2013, background): “Scholars such as Gigerenzer (1996, 2000) counter such normative assumptions, arguing that heuristic processing has the advantage of being “fast and frugal” and, often, leads to successful outcomes.”
The null ritual : What you always wanted to know about significance testing but were afraid to ask (2004, background): “Furthermore, he believed that many researchers are not interested in statistical thinking in the fi rst place but solely in getting their papers published (Gigerenzer, 2000).”
Fast, frugal, and rational: How rational norms explain behavior (2003, background): “…Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in a way that is generally reliable and efficient for achieving one's goals Rationality2: Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting when one has a reason for what one does sanctioned by a…”
The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (2004, background): “[1998], Gigerenzer et al. [1999], Gigerenzer and Selten [2001], and”
Morality, culture and the dialogic self: taking cultural pluralism seriously (2008, background): “Gigerenzer (2000) showed vividly how early cognitive scientists developed very different models of ‘the computational mind’ depending on how well their computers worked.”
Logic Tree Branch Weights and Probabilities: Summing up to One is not Enough (2011, result): “The approach to first rank and then sequentially assign weights is not only similar to the generation of probabilistic uniform random weights in the case of a state of non-informativeness, but also similar to what is believed by some psychologist to happen during individual human decision processes ”