Communication and Coordination in Social Networks
By Michael Suk-Young Chwe. 2000
388 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9fc4871edca7f1794adf71299f7c33798a7ba95a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Justus Haucap
- Ethan BUENO DE MESQUITA
- Fernando Vega-Redondo
- A. Çatık
- Leeat Yariv
- Mehmet Karaçuka
- Noam Yuchtman
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Fernando Vega-Redondo
- Leeat Yariv
- Ethan BUENO DE MESQUITA
- Dean Phillips Foster
- Antoni Calvó-Armengol
- A. Çatık
- Justus Haucap
In Safety Research
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Fernando Vega-Redondo
- Dean Phillips Foster
- A. Çatık
- Justus Haucap
- M. Walton
- Mehmet Karaçuka
- David Y. Yang
Citations in the corpus
- The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks (2000, background): “3 The relationship between network structure and the dynamics of contagion processes has been examined in other settings by Goyal and Janssen (1996), Chwe (2000), and Morris (2000).”
- Communication and influence (2015, background): “The last expression, combined with (18) and (19), constitutes the statement of the theorem.”
- Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement* (2019, background): “See also Granovetter (1978), Kuran (1989, 1991, 1997), Chwe (2000), Fearon (2011), Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni (2011), Egorov and Sonin (2018) for models of protests in which participation is a game of strategic complements.”
- Diffusion, Strategic Interaction, and Social Structure (2011, background): “…enough to accommodate numerous further examples in the literature such as human capital investment (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2009)), crime and other networks (Ballester, CalvóArmengol, and Zenou (2006)), some coordination problems (Ellison (1993)), and the onset of social unrest (Chwe (2000)).”
- Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs (2010, background): “Chwe (1999, 2000) studies how close a communication network needs to get to creating common knowledge of payoffs in order to make coordinated outcomes feasible.”
- Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games (2007, background): “no need for selections of H and all equilibria are characterized by ( 2 ).”
- Network formation and social coordination (2005, neutral): “, Allen and Gale (2000), Bala and Goyal (1998), Chwe (2000), Coleman (1966), Ellison and”
- Culture and Public Action (2004, background): “By providing a space where everyone can view everyone else’s behavior, they also generate common knowledge and help solve the coordination problems inherent in collective action (Chwe 1999).”
- Collective action through common knowledge using a facebook model (2014, background): “We show how the limited information on the network structure, and the rich process of updating, tailored to the topology of the network, affect common knowledge and generate different results than in Chwe [6].”
- Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know About It (2011, background): “Simulation work (Siegel 2009) and models of network interaction and network games (Chwe 1999, 2000; Jackson 2008) have shown that the structure of network connections among agents has strong effects on the distribution of beliefs and, ultimately, choices across that group, providing some foundation…”
- Consumer choice and local network effects in mobile telecommunications in Turkey (2013, background): “For example, Chwe (2000) shows in a model of group formation that it is more reasonable to assume that each person only knows the network of his/her neighbors, but not the entire network.”