Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games
By Matthew O. Jackson, Leeat Yariv. 2007
328 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c4ea6c2782802f3dcf64e2dd051b0a8a8074a450
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Duncan J. Watts
- Dunia López-Pintado
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Rodolfo Baggio
- Jon M. Kleinberg
- Steven L. Johnson
- Samer Faraj
- Hazhir Rahmandad
In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
- Prasanna Gai
- S. Kapadia
- Dunia López-Pintado
- Duncan J. Watts
- Mark Newman
- Kristina Lerman
- Jon M. Kleinberg
- Jure Leskovec
Citations in the corpus
- Diffusion, Strategic Interaction, and Social Structure (2011, unknown): “We describe here the setup corresponding to that analyzed by Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2010) and Jackson and Yariv (2005, 2007), restricting attention to binary action games.21 Uncertainty is operationalized by assuming the network is determined according to some random…”
- RESILIENCE TO CONTAGION IN FINANCIAL NETWORKS (2011, unknown): “1 Some of previous work, mostly in the economics and sociology literature, investigates cascades on networks in a generic context; relevant references include Morris [42], Kleinberg [34], Jackson and Yariv [28] and Watts [50].”
- Contagion in financial networks (2010, background): “This precludes the type of strategic behaviour discussed by Morris (2000), Jackson and Yariv (2007) and Galeotti and Goyal (2007), whereby nodes can choose whether or not to adopt a particular state (e.g. adopting a new technology).”
- History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms (2014, unknown): “equilibrium involves a High social norm where all endogenous players play High, and the conditions under which following a prominent play of Low, the greatest equilibrium involves a Low social norm where all endogenous players play Low.(17) “History” throughout refers to the public history h.”
- Network Structure and the Aggregation of Information: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia (2016, unknown): “…originates in the epidemiological literature (see e.g., Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2001)), it has also been extended to study the diffusion of information through the network (e.g. Jackson and Yariv (2007); Jackson and Rogers (2007); Galeotti and Vega-Redondo (2011); López-Pintado (2008)).”
- Social Influence, Binary Decisions and Collective Dynamics (2008, background): “Also, Galeotti et al. (2007) and Jackson and Yariv (2007) have proposed models of network games that encompass prisoner dilemmas, coordination and anti-coordination games.”
- Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform Businesses (2010, unknown): “Jackson and Yariv (2007) discuss formally identical cases in the context of network games.”
- The Economic Consequences of Social Network Structure (2017, unknown): “, Simmel (1908), Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), Burt (1992)) as well as in empirical observations (Coleman et al.”