Delegation and agency in international organizations

481 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending (2010, unknown): “In recent years, international relations (IR) scholars have increasingly turned to principal–agent theories to study international institutions in general and the IMF in particular (Gould 2003, 2006; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney 2006; Martin 2006).”
Public-Private Partnerships for the Earth: Politics and Patterns of Hybrid Authority in the Multilateral System (2010, background): “Hawkins and Jacoby 2006. vide windows of opportunity for organizational leaders to engage in such collaborations.39 The principal-agent model also reminds us, however, that IOs can act as entrepreneurs of PPPs mostly within the constraints of their agency autonomy.”
Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council (2009, background): “12 Also see Hawkins et al. (2006) for more general arguments.”
The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy (2012, unknown): “In PA models in international relations, governments are principals who have a choice of whether to delegate policy-making to agents, namely international institutions (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Tierney 2006).”