Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities

By Anat R. Admati, P. Pfleiderer. 2000

481 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9dfed55fc7525a8c0344f60d93a392d8d4473bb2

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Citations in the corpus

Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (2008, unknown): “Dye (1990) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) analyze positive externalities in the form of information transfers and liquidity spillovers in capital markets.”
Global Accounting Convergence and the Potential Adoption of IFRS by the United States: An Analysis of Economic and Policy Factors (2009, background): “Finally, it is important to note that the effects of reporting and disclosure often extend beyond the firm providing the information (e.g., Dye, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008).”
The economic value of regulated disclosure: Evidence from the banking sector (2006, unknown): “For example, information generated by one firm could confer benefits to others who did not pay for its production in the form of liquidity spillovers (Dye, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000).”
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review (2019, unknown): “Finally, although peer-firm disclosure is also purported to affect related firm investment by lowering adverse selection costs (Dye, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000), we are unaware of any empirical study that isolates this mechanism. Shroff et al. (2017) provide evidence that a firm’s disclosure ”
Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements (2011, unknown): “Static disclosure models with multiple firms that relate well to our model are found in Dye (1990) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000). Both these papers consider firms with correlated information and model quality of disclosure as a (costly) choice of firms that affects the precision of disclosure.”
Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth (2009, unknown): “Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) consider a model of disclosure with multiple firms whose costs are correlated.”
Information Control, Career Concerns and Corporate Governance (2006, unknown): “…literature on information disclosure that examines issues such as firms’ voluntary information disclosure incentives and optimal disclosure regulations (Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), Boot and Thakor (2001)), as well as information spillover effects (Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), Yosha (1995)).”
The Many Faces of Information Disclosure (2001, methodology): “The desirability of disclosure regulation has recently been analyzed by Admati and Pfleiderer (2000). securities markets and dictates disclosure requirements.”
Firm Growth and Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis (2005, unknown): “For example, if increased disclosure reveals information to competitors or others who interact strategically with the firm, it may cause the firm to lose competitive advantage or bargaining power (Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)). In the presence of both benefits and costs of disclosure, extant theory ”
Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide (2013, unknown): “…can reduce the disclosing parties’ cost of capital, but may also impose cost on them in losing competitive advantage or bargaining power due to the revelation of information to their competitors (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Fishman and Hagerty (1998, 2003), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)).”
Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation (2012, unknown): “…literature provides two other motivations for regulation: at U niversity of N orth C arolina at C hapel H ill on M ay 20, 2013 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from time-inconsistent preferences (Kydland and Prescott 1977) and information externalities (Admati and Pfleiderer 2000).”