Firm Growth and Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis

By Inder K. Khurana, Xiumin Martin, Raynolde Pereira. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2005

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What drives mandatory and voluntary risk reporting variations across Germany, UK and US? (2015, unknown): “Third, Khurana, Pereira, and Martin (2006) argue that, as disclosure enhances the ability to obtain external 4 This aggregate equation combines levels 1 and 2, where level 1 variations occur within firms as a function of time and standard error, and level 2 variations occur between firms, based on…”
The effects of voluntary disclosure and dividend propensity on prices leading earnings (2009, background): “…future earnings, one possible response for firms with significant unrecognised intangible assets or high-growth prospects is to make voluntary disclosure in order to convey value-relevant information in a more timely way (Gelb, 2002; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2005 and Khurana et al., 2006).”
Does Enhanced Disclosure Really Reduce Agency Costs? Evidence from the Diversion of Corporate Resources (2012, background): “To the extent that an expanded disclosure activity is induced by high investment growth, such control will be important (Khurana et al. 2006).”
Aggregated, Voluntary and Mandatory Risk Disclosure Incentives: Evidence from UK FTSE All Share Companies (2013, background): “Third, Khurana et al. (2006) argue that because disclosure enhances firms’ ability to obtain external financing by reducing information asymmetry, firm growth is likely to positively impact disclosure levels.”