Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership

By Kee H. Chung, Hao Zhang. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2010

578 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e843ded9934809db9673b581b911d586d6ac4438

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading (2016, unknown): “This measure has been used in several papers including Aggarwal et al. (2009), Bernile and Jarrell (2009), Chung et al. (2010) and Chung and Zhang (2011).”
A simple approximation of intraday spreads using daily data (2014, unknown): “…Milbourn, 2012), (7) corporate innovation (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2013), (8) institutional investors' stock selection decisions (Falkenstein, 1996; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Huang, 2013), and (9) asset pricing (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Spiegel and Wang, 2005).4 Readily 2See Barclay, Christie,…”
How Do Foreign Institutional Investors Enhance Firm Innovation? (2017, unknown): “ 14 This way of quantifying the size of the effect of foreign institutional ownership is consistent with several studies on institutional ownership, such as Chung and Zhang (2011) and Wahal and McConnell (2000).”
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “For example, Chung and Zhang (2011) conclude that the positive association between institutional ownership and good governance structure is driven by institutional investors gravitating towards firms with good governance so as to minimize their own monitoring costs.”
Complexity of financial reporting standards and accounting expertise (2019, unknown): “We test this relation for low and high levels of institutional ownership, as institutional ownership are associated with enhanced monitoring and governance (e.g., Chen et al., 2007; Chung and Zhang, 2011).”
Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “…dollar invested in a passive fund benchmarked to the Russell 1000, very little of it will be invested in stocks at the bottom of that index, while for each dollar invested in a passive fund benchmarked to the Russell 2000, a large proportion of it will be invested in stocks at the top of the index.”
Corporate Social Performance and Firm Performance: Comparative Study among Developed and Emerging Market Firms (2019, background): “Firm characteristics, such as high institutional holdings, low insider holdings and high sales growth, are positively correlated with high governance quality [76].”
Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, unknown): “Based on prior literature [Chen et al. (2001), Hutton et al.”
Institutional Investor Stability and Crash Risk: Monitoring versus Short-Termism? (2013, background): “…(1988), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990, 1992), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Bushee (1998), Wahal and McConnell (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Parrino et al. (2003), Ajinkya et al. (2005), Bushee et al. (2008), Janakiraman et al. (2010), Aggarwal et al. (2010, 2011) and Chung and Zhang (2011).”