Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse
By Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. 2004
486 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9b61d4c2b086af6ff66d9d3e388a7aa845bc9caa
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Hans Degryse
- Andrea Gerali
- Rafael Repullo
- F. Signoretti
- Javier Suárez
- Vasso Ioannidou
- Bengt R. Holmstrom
In Finance
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Hans Degryse
- Allen N. Berger
- Rafael Repullo
- Vasso Ioannidou
- Geraldo Cerqueiro
- Javier Suárez
- M. Pagano
Citations in the corpus
- Competition and the Structure of Vertical Relationships in Capital Markets (2010, unknown): “In 1987, Citicorp, a frequent debt issuer, asked First Boston, its investment bank, to resign from the underwriting syndicate of one of Citicorp’s competitors, Manufacturers Hanover. Eccles and Crane (1988, 59) recount that “Citicorp apparently felt it was not worth the risk of having information . ”
- Bank Branch Presence and Access to Credit in Low-to-Moderate Income Neighborhoods (2010, unknown): “The claim that branch presence in low-income neighborhoods makes credit more accessible to the poor builds on the relationship-lending theory (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; von Thadden, 2002).”
- Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting (2010, methodology): “8 We simulate 300 cross-sectional samples of loan contracts from the equilibrium derived in von Thadden (2004), by randomizing the following structural parameters of the model: θ (proportion of “good” firms), pH-pL (difference in repayment probabilities between the “good” and the “bad” firm), and p…”
- Competition and Relationship Lending: Friends or Foes? (2011, unknown): “…to acquire costly private information on their clients, since they could share surpluses intertemporally, subsidizing credit-constrained firms at the beginning of the relationship and extracting the rent later (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; von Thadden, 2004; Ogura, 2009).”
- Evidence of jointness in the terms of relationship lending (2007, background): “The lack of strong results for Relation might be explained theoretically by the presence of strong competition among lenders as explained by Padilla and Pagano (1997) and von Thadden (2004).”
- 'Time for a Change': Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks (2010, methodology): “Download figure to PowerPoint All in all, our matching exercises suggest that good firms eventually pay a substantially higher loan rate the longer they borrow from the same bank, in line with the informational lock-in present in von Thadden (2004).”
- Group Membership, Relationship Banking and Loan Default Risk: The Case of Online Social Lending (2015, unknown): “Of course, favorable proprietary info may lead to higher interest rates, due to information capture (Houston and James, 1987; Von Thadden, 2004).”
- Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries (2009, result): “Firm-level data suggests that information sharing may indeed have a differential impact on credit availability for different firm types, in line with the discussion in the previous subsection.”
- Distance and Private Information in Lending (2010, background): “Similarly, banks might incur transportation costs in assessing loan applicants or in monitoring loans ( Sussman and Zeira, 1995 ), which affect credit terms.”
- Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring (2004, unknown): “(9) simplifies to ∆(1−mML) ¡R− rMLD¢ p − cm = 0, (31)”
- RELATIONSHIP LENDING WITHIN A BANK-BASED SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN SMALL BUSINESS DATA (2000, background): “This is empirical evidence supporting the mixed strategy equilibria in von Thadden (1998).”
- Inside and Outside Liquidity (2011, background): “In von Thadden (2004), a firm that waits may be unable to get access to funding due to adverse selection problems.”