Subnational leaders and economic growth: evidence from Chinese cities

By Yang Yao, Muyang Zhang. 2015

377 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Urban Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9b1c908898179086e3ac20d56f737fa1a88743d5

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Citations in the corpus

Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆ (2016, background): “…between GDP growth and promotion (Chen et al., 2005; Edin, 2003; Jia et al., 2014; Landry, 2008; Li and Zhou, 2005; Persson and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Yao and Zhang, 2015; Whiting, 2000).3 While this institutional arrangement has likely remained intact at the provincial level (thanks to the absence…”
Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China (2018, positive): “The first assumption has gained empirical support in the existing literature (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005; Wu et al., 2013; Yao and Zhang, 2015), whereas the second complementarity assumption has never been tested before.”
Career Incentives of City Leaders and Urban Spatial Expansion in China (2020, background): “Since the early 1980s, regional economic performance measures (such as total output and fiscal revenues) have been key performance indicators for the career advancement of local leaders, as documented in the literature (Li & Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011; Yao & Zhang, 2015; Tsai, 2016).”
Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China (2018, background): “Scholars have fiercely debated whether promotions in Chinese system are based on objective performance or political connections (Chen and Kung 2016; Keller 2016; Li and Zhou 2005; Opper, Nee, and Brehm 2015; Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012; Yao and Zhang 2015).”
Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China* (2018, background): “Party leaders are responsible for upholding political principles, making key policies, and maintaining the legitimacy and rule of the party (Guo, 2012; Yao and Zhang, 2015), whereas government leaders are responsible for implementing policies and carrying out administrative tasks in both economic an”
The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance (2019, background): “2012), political (Jones and Olken 2005; Yao and Zhang 2015; Persson and Zhuravskaya 2016; Jia 2017; Martinez-Bravo et al. 2017) and public sector (Xu 2018) leaders.”