Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆

By Ting Chen, James Kai Sing Kung. 2016

272 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dfd069a1ee106395df7344cd52922ab7952dcdb1

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Citations in the corpus

Career Incentives of City Leaders and Urban Spatial Expansion in China (2020, background): “According to Chen and Kung (2016) while land revenue accounted for less than 10% of extrabudgetary revenue before 1998, it grew phenomenally over time.”
Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China (2018, background): “Scholars have fiercely debated whether promotions in Chinese system are based on objective performance or political connections (Chen and Kung 2016; Keller 2016; Li and Zhou 2005; Opper, Nee, and Brehm 2015; Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012; Yao and Zhang 2015).”
The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them* (2020, background): “…(2004); Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006); Dunning (2008); Ramsay (2011); Caselli and Michaels (2013); Brollo et al. (2013); McGuirk (2013); Ferraz and Monteiro (2014); Borge, Parmer, and Torvik (2015); Timmons and Garfias (2015); Chen and Kung (2016); Gadenne (2017); and Martinez (2019).”
Exporting Out of Agriculture: The Impact of WTO Accession on Structural Transformation in China (2019, unknown): “…in the literature on the Chinese 2For example, in 2000, the average U.S. MFN tariff was 4%, but China would have faced an average non-MFN tariff of 31% had its MFN status been revoked. economy, corresponding to a local labor market with defined fiscal and economic policies (Chen & Kung, 2016).”
Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market* (2018, background): “To 17Although land rights were devolved to the local governments as early as 1998, transactions in the primary land market were infrequent back then and did not pick up until the early-to-mid 2000s (Chen and Kung, 2016).”
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder (2018, background): “…1984), or specifically the Party’s Central Committee members (Meyer et al., 2016; Shih et al., 2012), while those who detect economic performance often use data at the provincial level (Bo, 2002; Huang, 1996; Jia, Kudamatsu, & Seim, 2015; Sheng, 2010) and below (T. Chen & Kung, 2016; Guo, 2007).”