THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
By Gary J. Miller. 2005
776 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Public Administration, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9acced5eec4373b0b2f5f0f4f205a18f8832914d
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Citations in the corpus
- Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government (2013, background): “The first is monitoring, which presents an important way to constrain leader misbehavior (Bjorkman and Svensson 2010; Miller 2005; Olken 2007).”
- Teacher Evaluation Policy and Conflicting Theories of Motivation (2014, background): “Miller, G. J. (2005). The political evolution of principal-agent models.”
- Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China (2018, background): “…on affinities based on ideological distance or party labels, I argue that in a setting where overt ideological differentiation is limited and partisan competition is absent, informal, patron-client relations offer another im- 3For a review of this literature in political science, see Miller (2005).”
- Transparency is not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption (2010, background): “…but that the more they are reduced the less room there will be for shirking and the more efficient will be the delegation (Holmström, 1979; Miller 2005).3 The strong hopes placed in transparency in the corruption literature usually stem, explicitly or implicitly, from such a…”