Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence

By Helge Berger, Jakob de Haan, Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger. Social Science Research Network, 2001

471 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper reviews recent research on central bank independence (CBI). After we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness, the literature on optimal inflation contracts is discussed, followed by research in which the inflationary bias is endogenized. Finally, the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on CBI are reviewed. We conclude that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite robust.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9a88f333db83c7ee411e05b42ea8d91f7ecb6b27

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Axel Dreher
2. Jakob de Haan
3. Jan-Egbert Sturm
4. C. Borio
5. A. Aisen
6. Francisco Veiga
7. A. Cukierman
8. Haizhou Huang

In Finance

1. C. Borio
2. Jakob de Haan
3. Axel Dreher
4. Jan-Egbert Sturm
5. A. Cukierman
6. Haizhou Huang
7. Andrew J. Filardo
8. A. Aisen

Citations in the corpus

• Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose Their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set (2007, background): “2 See Berger et al. (2001) for a survey of the literature on central bank independence.”
• Reconsidering central bank independence (2002, background): “Although these problems are stated in the literature, the typical conclusion is that CBI is the best workable way to achieve low rates of inflation (see, for example, Berger et al., 2001a ).”
• Political instability and inflation volatility (2006, background): “2 Cukierman et al. (1992) find that central bank independence reduces inflation volatility.”
• Inflation and Central Bank Independence: A Meta Regression Analysis (2010, unknown): “Also the effects of CBI on inflation will be different in this setting compared to the standard Rogoff-type of model (see Berger et al. (2001) for a further discussion).”
• A tale of two perspectives: old or new challenges for monetary policy? (2003, background): “This is found in central bank statements (eg Vickers (1999a), Dodge (2003)) and also academic work (eg Bernanke et al (1999a) and Cukiermann (2002)).”
• Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (2006, unknown): “This information is mainly obtained from Lybek and Morris (2004); other sources are the Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory, Fry et al. (2000), and Ize (2006).”
• Is There Any Link between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean (2008, unknown): “All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.003 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect European Journal of Political Economy j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r.com/ locate /e jpe with inflation (see a survey by Berger et al., 2001).”
• Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future (2008, background): “Previous surveys appear in Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) and in Berger et al. (2001) .”
• Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Institutional Quality (2006, background): “1 See Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Berger et al. (2001) for surveys of the literature.”
• Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness (2008, unknown): “The literature on CBI is voluminous (Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996 and Berger, Eijffinger, and de Haan, 2001 provide useful summaries).”