Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?

By Helge Berger, Volker Nitsch, Tonny Lybek. Social Science Research Network, 2006

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/77920d17c7e18fd666c6001396b7e181a94d138d

Citations in the corpus

• Fiscal Policies and Business Cycles in an Enlarged Euro Area (2008, unknown): “Berger et al. (2007) argue that the differences in the overall fiscal stance of the Central European accession countries can be explained by the bargaining position of the countries visà-vis the other EU countries with respect to the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria.”