Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose Their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set

By Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, Jakob de Haan. Social Science Research Network, 2007

238 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3531a3ce4ab9ce7d4729b84e90cd20eef410d091

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. A. Cukierman
2. P. Geraats
3. Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
4. Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche

Citations in the corpus

• The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset (2018, unknown): “De facto indices, however, are known to suffer from important limitations such as the fact that the reasons behind the dismissal of the governor are not considered or the fact that they focus on the governor only and overlook the entire board of directors (see, among others Dreher et al., 2008).”