Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership Concentration

By J. Edwards, M. Nibler. 2000

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9831ba76ae2d8239e65ab594086da7cef5ffc5e6

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Citations in the corpus

Product market competition, corporate governance and firm performance: An empirical analysis for Germany (2002, background): “However, recent evidence suggests that proxy voting is extremely unlikely to significantly enhance bank voting power (Edwards and Nibler, 2000).”
The political economy of comparative corporate governance (2003, background): “Moreover, the level of employee shareholding in these companies was relatively low; on average, employees held 3.7 percent of the capital of these companies which is considerably lower than in the US and Britain (L’Observatoire de l’Actionnariat Salarié en Europe, 2001; Balligand and Foucauld, 2000:”
The Determinants of Capital Structure: Capital Market-Oriented versus Bank-Oriented Institutions (2008, unknown): “Agency costs and indirect bankruptcy costs are also known to be higher in Anglo-Saxon countries due to the arm's length relation between creditors and borrowers (Edwards and Nibler (2000)).”
Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They are Worth, and Why They are (Still) There (2010, unknown): “Edwards and Nibler (2000) investigate a cross-section of 156 of the largest non-financial German firms and find a positive impact of the equity ownership of the top three banks, but they undertake neither causality analysis nor control for unobserved heterogeneity and several other effects we…”
Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China (2014, background): “According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Edwards and Nibler (2000), concentrated ownership enhances corporate control by improving the monitoring of management.”
Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards (2006, unknown): “In contrast to Cable (1985), but consistent with Edwards and Nibler (2000), we find little evidence in favor of a value-creating role for bank representation on the supervisory board.”
Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany (2008, unknown): “The results of Edwards and Weichenrieder are in line with prior findings of Edwards and Nibler (2000) which concluded that ownership concentration is a more important factor in the German corporate governance system than banks, which originally were thought to posses a dominating role.”