The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance

By R. Romano. 2004

593 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/97e1c35e0bd3218ad0eab2e3b5246d2659cb3e5a

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Citations in the corpus

Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms (2012, unknown): “Romano (2005) believes that undue haste in imposing corporate governance convergence may lead to “quack governance”.2 Another feature of the board that has attracted the attention of corporate governance scholars is the size of the board.”
Audit Committee, Underpricing of IPOs, and Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts (2008, unknown): “Some questions remain about the effectiveness of these regulations (Romano 2005).”
Form versus Substance: The Implications for Auditing Practice and Research of Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance (2008, background): “For example, Romano (2004) argues that the research has been inconclusive in demonstrating the advantage of requiring independence of all AC members, versus having only a majority of independent AC members.”
Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (2009, unknown): “Coffee (2006); Grundfest (1994); Romano (2005); Cox et al. (2003).”
The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books (2008, unknown): “” Romano (2004) calls for Sarbanes-Oxley’s “quack” corporate governance guidelines to be stripped of their mandatory force.”
Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, background): “In this regard, financial crises often beget more complex and stringent disclosure rules (Romano, 2004), but continued strengthening of governance mechanisms may represent too much of a good thing (Bruno & Claessens, 2010).”
Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management (2006, unknown): “Our paper also contributes to the emerging literature on the costs of regulation and SOX itself on firms (e.g., see Ribstein, 2002; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Romano, 2005; Zhang, 2005; Li et al., 2006).”