Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction.
By Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich, K. Haley, Serena J. Eng, Daniel M.T. Fessler. 2007
248 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/97ac8d2fc1d18fb59adf0cf829a3d68c9c040d92
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
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Citations in the corpus
- The Moral Psychology Handbook (2010, background): “Recently, however, a growing body of evidence has emerged that challenges the research tradition on the distinction between moral and conventional norms in psychology (Gabennesch, 1990; Haidt et al., 1993; Kelly et al., 2007).”
- The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy (2010, background): “basis of morality (see e.g., Kelly et al. 2007 ).”
- Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. (2011, unknown): “Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, and Fessler (2007) found that participants did condone harm as morally appropriate when they perceived it as an accepted practice in a particular social-relational context, such as the case of 17th-century sailors being beaten for insubordination.”