The emotional basis of moral judgments

By J. Prinz. 2006

363 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9763e4207eb48def301e0269a8600bbf161935b4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Leland F. Saunders
2. Geoffrey P. Goodwin
3. C. Daniel Batson
4. J. Kennett
5. C. Fine
6. J. Darley
7. Kevin M. Carlsmith
8. H. Maibom

In Social Psychology

1. Leland F. Saunders
2. C. Daniel Batson
3. J. Kennett
4. C. Fine
5. Geoffrey P. Goodwin
6. J. Darley
7. Jamil Zaki
8. N. Migliaccio

Citations in the corpus

• What’s Wrong with Morality? (2011, background): “Moral principles and standards are often assumed to be intrinsically motivating and “designed to regulate behavior” (Prinz, 2006, p. 41).”
• The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy (2010, background): “Prinz (2006) has usefully categorized the possible relationships that could be argued for.”
• Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? (2009, result): “Simple sentimentalism (e.g., Prinz 2006 ) and emotivist accounts of moral judgment which see the twin function of moral judgment as the expression of sentiments and the influencing of others (e.g., Ayer 1936; Stevenson 1937) are in line with the SIM.”
• What is moral reasoning? (2015, background): “…argue that these data show that domain-general reasoning has little, if any, role in moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008a; Prinz, 2006, 2007), while others argue that emotions and moral reasoning are independent pathways for arriving at a moral judgment (Greene, 2008;…”