Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games

By P. D. Bo. 2005

647 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9680577b6f92f19f2654c1326c67520cd397ddf0

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Citations in the corpus

Pandemics and Supply Chain Management Research: Toward a Theoretical Toolbox* (2020, background): “Following a pandemic, the “shadow of the future” proposition suggests that firms will be more likely to cooperate—or at least not act opportunistically— in order to prevent being “punished” by buyers and suppliers in future pandemics (Bó, 2005).”
Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination (2016, positive): “For example, Dal Bó & Fréchette (2015) provide evidence that strategies beside Grim and”
On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey (2018, positive): “Dal Bó (2005) exploits the fact that a small variation in payoffs can result in a large variation in the set of outcomes that can be supported in equilibrium.”
Building Social Capital Through Microfinance (2010, positive): “Specifically, a participant is informed Laboratory experiments that randomly vary continuation probabilities in repeated games also provide evidence on incentives to cooperate – e.g. Dal Bo (2005) shows that cooperation is higher in infinitely repeated laboratory games.”
The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence (2011, neutral): “1”
Learning and the Economics of Small Decisions (2013, neutral): “14 Dal Bó (2005) ran repeated PD games with and without a fixed termination period.”
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, neutral): “1 to include private information about players’ payoffs, so that parties learn about their partners as an equilibrium progresses; see MacLeod and Malcomson (1988), Watson (1999, 2002), and Halac (2011), for example.”
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World (2012, methodology): “Dal Bó, Pedro.”
Backplay: "Man muss immer umkehren" (2018, neutral): “In contrast, humans are much better at ﬁnding these coordinating and cooperating equilibria (Bó, 2005; Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016).”
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2018, neutral): “…on the included studies: henceforth, Andreoni & Miller (1993) will be identified as AM1993, Cooper, DeJong, Fosythe & Ross (1996) as CDFR1996, Dal Bó (2005) as DB2005, Bereby-Meyer & Roth (2006) as BMR2006, and Friedman & Oprea (2012) as FO2012. length of the horizon, and decrease with the…”