The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

By P. D. Bo, Guillaume R. Fréchette. 2011

533 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ff2eb8a460dd6ba160cfbb5dc09a1aa8f7bbfc51

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In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Why We Cooperate (2014, background): “When subjects playing repeated PDs have a sufficiently large probably of interacting again with the same partner in the next round, they learn to cooperate (Blonski, Ockenfels, & Spagnolo, 2011; Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011; Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008; Fudenberg, Rand, & Dreber, 2012; Rand, ”
Learning and the Economics of Small Decisions (2013, background): “3 Framing In addition to the two conditions described above, Daniely (2000) studied the effect of framing.”
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2018, unknown): “12Online Appendix A.2 provides more details on the included studies: henceforth, Andreoni & Miller (1993) will be identified as AM1993, Cooper, DeJong, Fosythe & Ross (1996) as CDFR1996, Dal Bó (2005) as DB2005, Bereby-Meyer & Roth (2006) as BMR2006, and Friedman & Oprea (2012) as FO2012. length of”
Playing repeated games with large language models (2023, unknown): “Further experiments on GPT-4’s final round behaviour have shown that it did not adjust its behavior in the last round of games or when faced with varying probabilities of continuation, unlike human players who often increase cooperation when future interactions are likely 42,43 .”
Implementation of a multi-agent environmental regulation strategy under Chinese fiscal decentralization: An evolutionary game theoretical approach (2019, result): “Second, this study deviates from mainstream EGT research focused primarily on two-player games of identical or different subjects (Dal B o and Fr echette, 2011; Liu, 2015).”
Intelligence, Personality, and Gains from Cooperation in Repeated Interactions (2019, methodology): “We use the samemethodused inDal Bó and Fréchette (2011).”
On doing relevant and rigorous experiments: Review and recommendations (2018, methodology): “However, instead of lying to subjects, researches could simply use the “continuation probability” method (see e.g., Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011 for an example).”
Placebo inference on treatment effects when the number of clusters is small (2018, methodology): “Example 5.4 (Infinitely repeated games; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011).”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “In games with repetition or reputation, these more complicated strategies explicitly condition their behavior on previous events (Dal Bó and Fré chette, 2011; Fudenberg et al., in press; Wedekind and Milinski, 1996; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000).”