Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making

By Clare Lombardelli, James Proudman, J. Talbot. 2005

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Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach (2014, methodology): “Essentially we face a variable selection problem: which topics are informative about FOMC members’ policy preferences? To resolve this, we first obtain the voiced dissent measure from Meade (2005). The FOMC under Greenspan operated under a strong norm for consensus which means that the voting record”
Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How? (2007, background): “Second, we are looking into whether committees do better when they have a clear leader (representing the central 11 Lombardelli et al (2005) subsequently replicated our findings (qualitatively).”
Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (2006, unknown): “This information is mainly obtained from Lybek and Morris (2004); other sources are the Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory, Fry et al.”
Understanding the Greenspan Standard (2005, background): “106 See Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli et al. (2005), which replicates Blinder and Morgan’s findings (and adds a few new ones).”