Understanding the Greenspan Standard
By Alan S. Blinder, Ricardo Reis. 2005
231 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a6315ef63607343cb14e7286048333a78189fbb4
How researchers see this paper
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- Anton Korinek
- Olivier Jeanne
- Tanya Molodtsova
- Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy
- David H. Papell
- W. Buiter
- Alan S. Blinder
- Kenneth S. Rogoff
Citations in the corpus
- How Central Should the Central Bank Be (2010, unknown): “18 Cf. Blinder and Reis (2005), pp. 64-70.”
- The Economics of the Fed Put (2020, unknown): “, Blinder and Reis (2005), Diamond and Rajan (2012)). This could happen in an ex-post sense with agents adding leverage as the Fed lowers the interest rate and thereby reduces the cost of leverage (as in the model of Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018) where financial institutions hold liquidity bu”
- Central banks and financial crises (2008, background): “Chart 5 here 12 For a conflicting and very positive appraisal of the Greenspan years see Blinder and Reis (2005).”
- Taylor Rules with Real-Time Data: A Tale of Two Countries and One Exchange Rate (2008, methodology): “during the Greenspan period, core CPI inflation instead of headline inflation could be used as in Blinder and Reis (2005). Since, in order to consider exchange rate predictability, a sample is needed that begins and ends earlier, the choice of the GDP deflator seems more appropriate.”
- Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash (2020, background): “In this context, the so-called “Greenspan doctrine”(see Greenspan, 2002, 2011; Blinder and Reis, 2005) suggests that ex-ante interventions to prevent booms are too blunt compared to “mopping up”measures after a financial crisis has materialized.”
- Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How? (2007, background): “The Greenspan Fed was a good example, as 10 See Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea (2005), especially Table 4.”
- A Vicious Cycle of Manias, Crashes and Asymmetric Policy Responses - An Overinvestment View (2011, unknown): “In the so called Jackson Hole Consensus US central bankers agreed that central banks do not have sufficient information to spot and prick bubbles, but should intervene in times of financial turmoil (Blinder and Reis 2005).”
- Financial Factors in Economic Fluctuations (2010, unknown): “[17] Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1993, ‘Consumption and the Recession of 1990-1991,’ American Economic Review, May; 83(2): 270-74 [18] Blinder, Alan S.”
- A Tale of Two Policies- Prudential Regulation and Monetary Policy with Fragile Banks (2009, unknown): “Second, our model brings evidence to the old debate between those who contended that monetary policy should target inflation in the goods’ market only (see Bernanke and Gertler [2], and Blinder and Reis [4] for a summary of the debate) and those arguing that monetary policy should react to asset pri”