The Dynamics of Political Compromise

By Avinash Dixit, Gene M. Grossman, Faruk Gul. Journal of Political Economy, 2000

258 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9537203f8df87eea382db6129b168ecdafae1bdd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Manuel Amador
2. Satoru Takahashi
3. Nicolas Vieille
4. Marina Azzimonti
5. M. Tommasi
6. P. Spiller

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Manuel Amador
2. Marina Azzimonti
3. M. Tommasi
4. P. Spiller
5. W. Oates

Citations in the corpus

• The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina (2003, methodology): “50 This model is a simplification of Saporiti, Spiller and Tommasi (2002) 51 This is a very simplified version of several richer collective decision making mechanisms, as those in Alesina (1988), Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000).”
• A Political Economy Model of Sovereign Debt Repayment (2002, background): “Tabellini (1991), and Dixit and Londregan (2000) present models of sustainability of domestic debt 4 .”
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem (2010, background): “Consider the following game, loosely inspired by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) and Phelan (2006).”
• Barriers to Investment in Polarized Societies (2011, methodology): “See Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) for efficient allocation rules that are not Markov in the political game. future, and it is particularly relevant for long-run outcomes.”
• Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds (2009, unknown): “According to the structural model, this is due to strong party-coalition effects, although other structural explanations, such as the one posited by Dixit et al. (2000), remain possibilities.”
• A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2005, unknown): “where m(pg) = c(pg) − x(pg) is imports (possibly negative) of good g, and thus the three terms in (2) represent labor income, capital income, and rebated tariff revenue, respectively.”
• Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect (2014, unknown): “Similar to Dixit et al. (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2011), there exist non-Markov equilibria with properties different from the Markov equilibrium we characterize, as we show in footnote 14.”