The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina

By P. Spiller, M. Tommasi. 2003

278 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Public policies are the outcomes of complex intertemporal exchanges among politicians. The political institutions of a country constitute the framework within which these transactions are accomplished. We develop a transactions theory to understand the ways in which political institutions affect the transactions that political actors are able to undertake, and hence the quality of the policies that emerge. We argue that Argentina is a case in which the functioning of political institutions has inhibited the capacity to undertake efficient intertemporal political exchanges. We use positive political theory and transaction cost economics to explain the workings of Argentine political institutions and to show how their operation gives rise to low-quality policies. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/53f44157b3ffef5f6df291e011002989f3c8d3a1

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. B. Morgan
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Citations in the corpus

• Understanding the rise of the regulatory state of the South (2012, background): “Similarly, Urueña (2012) shows in this issue how the Colombian Constitutional Court mediated conflicts between neoliberals and neoconservatives over the structure of water regulation, upholding the policy of privatisation through independent regulatory authorities, but requiring them to establish a ”
• Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (2006, unknown): “1999), the political facilitation of private agreements (Richman and Boerner 2006), and the making of public policy (Dixit 1996; Spiller and Tommasi 2003).”
• Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison (2011, unknown): “6 Treisman (2000) and Gerring and Thacker (2004) thoroughly explore the relationship between federalism and corruption.”
• THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (2008, unknown): “See Spiller and Tommasi (2003).”