Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance: A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance

By L. Bebchuk, Mark J. Roe. 2004

860 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/944bcadfd4b178d3edc46bcc3aa500ac545a9e9f

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New institutional accounting and IFRS (2011, positive): “Complementarities also imply that countries’ institutional systems exhibit path dependence, which in turn suggests a role for historical analyses (e.g. Bebchuk and Roe 1999, Waymire and Basu 2007).”
ALFRED MARSHALL LECTURE SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION, STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICS (2006, neutral): “In contrast, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) question the idea of smooth and rapid convergence towards a single system of corporate governance, since political and economic forces tend to promote path dependence in corporate law and business practice.”
The Social Dimensions of Entrepreneurship (2005, positive): “Because both cultural and legal institutions are difficult to change (Milhaupt 1998; Roe 1996; Bebchuk and Roe 1999), firms in emerging economies select institutional strategies so that they can at least individually gain long-term access to outside resources and capabilities.”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, neutral): “But Bebchuk (1999) and Bebchuk and Roe (1999) retort that although it is theoretically possible to design corporate charters that restrain self-dealing, in practice the Coase theorem is likely to break down and therefore regulations limiting blockholder rights are called for.”
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics (2010, background): “…of investor protection levels affect not only the allocation of cash flows from the capital that will be raised from public investors in the future but also the allocation of rents from the capital that public firms already have (Bebchuk and Roe (1999), La Porta et al. (2000), Stulz (2005)).”
Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “This stability is often explained with reference to the path‐dependent nature of corporate structure—in particular, initial ownership structures give some parties both incentives and power to impede change (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999 ).”
Corporate governance in Turkey: an overview and some policy recommendations (2003, background): “and legal structures (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). As Oman (2001) notes, oligopolistic coalitions who frequently operate as corporate insiders in developing countries, cling”
Ownership structure, governance, and innovation (2015, background): “Second, firms' ownership structure exhibits a high degree of persistence: such a persistence is observed in many countries (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) and is particularly pronounced in the Italian context (Bianchi and Bianco, 2008; Istat, 2013).”
Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance? A Comparison of Institutional and Efficiency Perspectives (2008, neutral): “The domestic elite may resist external pressure to adopt more effective governance practices if they undermine the private benefits of control of this group (e.g. Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Rhodes and van Apeldoom, 1998).”