Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*

By Anup Agrawal, Sahiba Chadha. Journal law and economy, 2005

1,629 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/92cad84c8d52add8373a326e3ec8527af9bc033a

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Citations in the corpus

Globalizing the Boardroom - The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2012, background): “Certain board characteristics, such as board independence and the presence of financial experts on the board, are shown to rein in firms’ earnings management behavior and reduce the probability of earnings restatements (Klein (2002) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005)).”
Managerial Ability and Earnings Quality (2013, result): “(2007), while the coefficient on board independence does not differ significantly from zero, consistent with Agrawal and Chadha (2005).”
Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management (2006, neutral): “…audit committee financial expertise has on auditor independence (Carcello and Neal, 2003), fraud and earnings restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), financial reporting quality 1 See DeFond and Francis (2005) for an excellent summary of the audit research before and…”
Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth (2007, positive): “Consistent with Agrawal and Chadha (2005), the presence of an outside director with financial expertise and the absence of a firm-founder lowers the likelihood of financial fraud.”
Corporate Securities Fraud: Insights from a New Empirical Framework (2013, neutral): “2 For example, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) examine the effect of board independence and financial expertise on the incidence of fraud.”
Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China (2006, methodology): “study, Agrawal and Chadha (in press) examined firms that made earnings restatements that involved the correction of prior period earnings errors or manipulations. They found that if the outside directors had at least one member with an accounting or finance background then earnings restatements were”
Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud (2008, background): “Such a curvilinear relationship may explain why prior studies did not find evidence of a linear effect between these variables (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005).”
Corporate Fraud and Managers’ Behavior: Evidence from the Press (2010, background): “…that the likelihood of committing fraud has typically been investigated using financial and/or governance variables (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Caruso, 2002; Erickson et al., 2006; Farber, 2005; Kinney et al., 2004; Srinivasan, 2005).1 The moral,…”
Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management: The Role of Status (2014, background): “Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find a negative association between financial expertise and restatement likelihood in a sample of 159 public companies earnings restatements between 2000 and 2001 (including restatements that would be considered irregularities). troubled firms, and Pollock et al. (2010)…”
Financial Expertise of Directors (2008, background): “For example, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that having directors with a CPA, CFA, or similar degree on audit committees translates into fewer earnings restatements, and DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) document a positive stock market reaction to the appointment of directors with accounting knowledge to”