Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism

By Simon Johnson, Daniel A. Kaufmann, J. Mcmillan, Christopher Woodruff. 2000

558 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/92b9c7f209081521c712b49af0ab05312808307e

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In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities (2004, unknown): “…view of corruption, recent empirical studies have found that corruption hampers growth, reduces investment and income, increases inequality, and increases the size of the unofficial economy (Friedman, et al., 2000, Johnson, et al., 2000, Li, et al., 2000, Mauro, 1995, Murphy, et al., 1993).”
Mixing business with politics: Political participation by entrepreneurs in China (2015, background): “Johnson et al. (2000) show that firms in some developing and transition economies such as Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates.”
Informal sector: The credit market channel (2005, background): “4See Loayza (1996), Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998), and Friedman et al.”
The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings (2014, unknown): “Johnson et al. (2000) use taxation, corruption and confidence in court as measures to investigate why firms conduct unofficial activities.”
Financial and Legal Constraints to Firm Growth: Does Size Matter? (2002, unknown): “Corruption may increase the size of the unofficial economy and lower efficiency since resources that are hidden may not find their highest-value uses (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Johnson et al., 2000).”
Research on entrepreneurship in the informal economy: Framing a research agenda (2013, background): “In a similar study of the informal economy in Central and Eastern Europe, Wallace and Latcheva (2006) note that the transition from socialismwas faster than the establishment of apparatuses to controlmarket activity, and corrupt agents subverted legislation in illegitimately grabbing for resources.”
Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction (2013, background): “…environment in which they operate, Mauro (1995) and Mo (2001) who examine the link between corruption and economic growth, and Friedman et al. (2000), Johnson et al. (2000), and Choi and Thum (2005) who examine the link between corruption and the size of a country (cid:1) s ‘‘underground’’ economy.”
Law Enforcement and Transition (2003, background): “Multiplicity of equilibria in transition economies has been already analyzed by Johnson et al. (1998) where multiplicity is related to the size of the unoScial sector in transition economies.”