Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency

By Frank Heinemann, G. Illing. 2002

140 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Uncertainty and Currency Crises: Evidence from Survey Data (2010, background): “10The original Morris-Shin game has been subject to several extensions, encompassing other distributions (Heinemann and Illing, 2002) and "large" speculators (Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin, 2004).”
Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination (2006, background): “Within a speculative-attack game, Heinemann and Illing (2002) suggest that the central bank should release information to each agent privately with some idiosyncratic noise, thereby avoiding common knowledge.”
Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change (2013, result): “The equilibrium uniqueness result contrasts with Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006), who were the first to emphasize endogenous information in global games.”
Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt (2004, methodology): “Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University”
THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION (2004, background): “2See Morris and Shin (1999), Daníelson et al. (2001), Heinemann and Illing (2002), Hellwig (2002), Metz (2002), and Prati and Sbracia (2002).”