THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION

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When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory (2007, unknown): “Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 2003; Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels, 2004 ).”
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments (2010, unknown): “16 For example, insofar as Heinemann et al. (2004) can test the theory of”
Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination (2006, background): “However, experimental evidence on herding games, like Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004), indicates that subjects do not fully account for higher order beliefs.”
Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk (2016, background): “Substituting (14) into ( 15 ), we have the probability”
Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows $ (2010, methodology): “Previous attempts to test predictions from a global-game setting were based on laboratory experiments (see: Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004)).”
Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, unknown): “For recent applications, see Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006), Hellwig (2005), Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009), and Lorenzoni (2009). It is tempting to interpret Townsend’s short cut as an approximate solution for the situation in which the past shocks never become common knowledge.”
Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research (2016, unknown): “23 Heinemann et al .”