Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?
By Brian Hare, J. Call, Michael Tomasello. Animal Behaviour, 2001
867 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Developmental Biology, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/927f78446abb5aa2ffa49e34bf2300187b463a99
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Michael Tomasello
- J. Call
- Henrike Moll
- Peter Carruthers
- Brian Hare
- Malinda Carpenter
- A. Melis
- Christophe Boesch
In Developmental Biology
- Michael Tomasello
- N. Emery
- Brian Hare
- Nicola S. Clayton
- J. Call
- Robin I. M. Dunbar
- E. MacLean
- Aaron A. Sandel
In Social Psychology
- Michael Tomasello
- Brian Hare
- J. Call
- Nicola S. Clayton
- N. Emery
- Christophe Boesch
- Malinda Carpenter
- Filippo Aureli
Citations in the corpus
- Domestic dogs are sensitive to a human's perspective (2009, background): “In contrast with chimpanzees in a competitive paradigm (Hare et al., 2001), dogs in the current study did not take into account what a human had seen in the immediate past.”
- Do chimpanzees know what others see – or only what they are looking at? (2006, methodology): “In one final study in Hare et al. (2001), both the dominant and the subordinate watched the food being hidden behind one of the two barriers; the dominant's evil eye was thus placed on it, and so on this interpretation it should be avoided at all costs.”
- We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind (2004, methodology): “Povinelli and Vonk (2003) applied this analysis to several recent experiments that are frequently championed by the Leipzig group as establishing that chimpanzees reason about mental states (e.g. Hare et al. 2000, 2001).”
- Why Don't Apes Point? (2006, background): “And some experiments have even demonstrated that chimpanzees know the content of what another sees, as individuals act differently if a competitor does or does not see a potentially contestable food item (Hare et al. 2000, 2001).”
- Putting the altruism back into altruism: the evolution of empathy. (2008, background): “…current consensus seems to be that apes, but probably not monkeys, show some level of perspective-taking both in their spontaneous social behavior (de Waal 1996, 1998 [1982]) and under experimental conditions (Bräuer et al. 2005; Hare et al. 2001, 2006; Hirata 2006; Shillito et al. 2005).”
- Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in cooperative cognitive tasks (2004, background): “The fact is that the paradigms in which chimpanzee social-cognitive skills have been most impressively displayed are all basically competitive in nature (Hare et al. 2000, 2001).”
- Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind" (2013, background): “(Source: Hare et al. 2001, pp. 142, fig.”
- Food-associated vocalizations in mammals and birds: what do these calls really mean? (2012, background): “This kind of hypothesis does not appear likely based on the current evidence for primates, aside from possibly great apes (e.g. Cheney & Seyfarth 1996, 1999; Hare et al. 2001).”
- Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds (2008, neutral): “A few years ago, however, Hare et al. (2000; 2001) reported " breakthrough " evidence that chimpanzees do, in fact, reason about certain psychological states in their conspecifics (see, particularly, Tomasello et al. 2003a; 2003b).”