Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare

By Timothy J. Besley, M. Smart. 2007

374 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/921a4489f09bf8fe7b222eb691224c75bdb03a62

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Citations in the corpus

Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt in OECD Countries (2003, neutral): “2 On Europe, see von Hagen (1992), de Haan et al. (1999), Milesi-Ferretti (forthcoming), and Hallerberg et al. (2001). On Latin America, see Alesina et al.”
Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons (2009, positive): “and Schmidheiny (2006) for individual income taxes and Feld and Kirchgässner (2003) for corporate income taxes show, fiscally induced mobility at the Swiss cantonal and local levels is relatively important.”
Revealed yardstick competition: Local government efficiency patterns in Norway (2007, background): “yardstick comparisons are concerned (Besley and Smart [8]).”
Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil (2018, background): “boni (2012), and Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2013). The procurement data are at the individual process level and span the entire range of locally provided public services in Brazil, including preventive and primary health care, elementary education, housing and urban infrastructure, a”
The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy (2016, background): “Besley and Smart (2007) provide an interesting welfare analysis of BBRs and other fiscal 3 Forty nine of the fifty U.S. states have some type of BBR (Vermont is the exception).”
International Tax Competition and Coordination (2014, positive): “An alternative view of electoral politics, one that also captures the self‐interest of policy makers that motivates the Edward‐Keen model, is explored by Besley and Smart (2007). They consider a world in which there are two types of politicians – some pure leviathans, concerned only with the surplus”
Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability (2015, background): “This is in line with principal-agent models of public finance in which asymmetries of information allow politicians to capture more rents (Besley and Smart, 2007) if we assume that citizens are better informed about increases in taxes than increases in transfers.”
Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities (2016, methodology): “This method allows multiple 5Other studies on tax competition include Besley and Case (1995), Besley and Smart (2007), Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Edwards and Keen (1996), Buettner (2001), Devereux et al. (2007), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Revelli (2006), and Rork…”
Term Limits and Electoral Accountability (2013, background): “P(xtjG)s(xt, pt)U( ˜ pt). ( 8 ) 6When we consider term limits, strategies will also condition on how many terms an incum-”
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments (2011, neutral): “7Besley (2006) is an adaptation the political agency model of Besley and Smart (2007) and Banks and Sundaram (1993), which extended the earlier work of Barro (1970), Ferejohn (1986), Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997).”
The “flat tax(es)”: principles and experience (2008, background): “Besley and Smart (2007) provide a more subtle analysis of this issue in a voting context, with policy makers of two potential types: some wholly self-seeking leviathans, the others wholly benevolent.”