Managerial Ownership and Accounting Disclosures: An Empirical Study

By D. Gelb. 2000

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91fca613bd2fe9c5716ce49f71d279f9fcb4d1f2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. K. Hussainey
2. Emma García‐Meca
3. J. P. Sánchez‐Ballesta
4. Tamer Elshandidy
5. V. Tauringana
6. Lyton Chithambo
7. I. Fraser
8. Khaleed Omair Alotaibi

In Finance

1. K. Hussainey
2. Emma García‐Meca
3. J. P. Sánchez‐Ballesta
4. Tamer Elshandidy
5. V. Tauringana
6. Lyton Chithambo
7. I. Fraser
8. Khaleed Omair Alotaibi

In Strategy and Management

1. K. Hussainey
2. V. Tauringana
3. Lyton Chithambo
4. Tamer Elshandidy
5. Emma García‐Meca
6. J. P. Sánchez‐Ballesta
7. I. Fraser
8. A. Gerged

Citations in the corpus

• Aggregated, Voluntary and Mandatory Risk Disclosure Incentives: Evidence from UK FTSE All Share Companies (2013, background): “To reduce this conflict, firms may provide more risk disclosures (e.g., Gelb, 2000; Eng and Mak, 2003; Deumes and Knechel, 2008).”
• The Association of Board Independence and Ownership Concentration with Voluntary Disclosure: A Meta-analysis (2010, background): “For instance, Felo et al. (2003) or Gelb (2000) examine financial reporting as measured by analysts in AIMR Review of Corporate Reporting Practices .”
• The effect of DEFRA guidance on greenhouse gas (2014, result): “Our results also fi t with previous fi ndings on board size (Cormier et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 2012), NEDs (Brammer and Pavelin (2008)), ownership concentration (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Matolcsy, Shan, & Seethamraju, 2012), and managerial ownership (Gelb, 2000).”
• Corporate disclosure, cost of capital and reputation: evidence from finance directors (2008, unknown): “Table 1 also shows two estimates of the percentage free float for the shares, as companies with a larger percentage free float, or lower managerial ownership, are expected to be more transparent, other things being equal (for example, Gelb, 2000).”
• The association between integrated reporting and firm valuation (2015, unknown): “The governance literature generally suggests that as boards become increasingly independent of managers, their monitoring effectiveness increases, thereby decreasing managerial opportunism and enhancing firm performance (Gelb 2000; Perry and Peyer 2005; Linck et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2008, 2009). Thu”