Social Capital, Corporate Culture, and Incentive Intensity

By Rafael Rob, Peter Zemsky. 2002

222 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91e10ec8a6009142e6e4f5d5800a94c91260b792

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Citations in the corpus

Social Incentives in the Workplace (2010, background): “Such concerns have been incorporated into economic analysis (Akerlof, 1980; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Rotemberg, 1994; Bewley, 1999; Rob and Zemsky, 2002).”
On the origin of shared beliefs (and corporate culture) (2010, unknown): “I will discuss both this and the economic literature on corporate culture (Kreps 1990, Crémer 1993, Lazear 1995, Carrillo and Gromb 1999, Hermalin 2001, Rob and Zemsky 2002) in section 5.”
Identity and the Economics of Organizations (2005, background): “…pecuniary incentives can " crowd out " nonmonetary incentives, such as fairness, reciprocity and adherence to social norms, thus leading to worse overall performance (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Rob and Zemsky, 2001; Huck, Kü bler and Weibull, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2011, unknown): “When individual effort in teamwork is unobservable, effort can be regarded as a voluntary contribution to a local public good (Holmström, 1982; Rob and Zemsky, 2002; Encinosa et al., 2007), and maintaining cooperation in such teams can, of course, be vital to firms' survival.”
Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort Experiment (2011, result): “24 In this regard, our results are consistent with the theoretical literature on personnel economics which shows that competition for promotions affects cooperative behavior in a negative way (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Lazear, 1991; Prendergast, 1999; Rob and Zemsky, 2002).”
On the Empirics of Social Capital (2002, unknown): “The notion that some agents are intrinsically more trustworthy than others is employed by Rob and Zemsky (2002) to understand how cooperative versus noncooperative corporate cultures are produced by ex ante differences in the proclivity of agents to cooperate.”
Competition, cooperation, and corporate culture (2011, unknown): “Previous papers have argued that different corporate cultures are the result of coordination (Kreps 1990), shared knowledge (Crémer 1993), asymmetric equilibria in the product market (Hermalin 1994), or differences in firms’ initial conditions (Rob and Zemsky 2002).”
The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups (2006, unknown): “…depends on members’ willingness to take unselfish, efficiency‐enhancing actions, or on what has variously been called “team spirit” (Kandel and Lazear 1992), “preferences for cooperation” (Rob and Zemsky 2002), or “motivational capital” (Akerlof and Kranton 2005).”