The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
By David Martimort, Lars A. Stole. Social Science Research Network, 2002
246 citations recorded by the source corpus.
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle - what we term the delegation principle - can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/914e2717ba63b7a71ad52600411c924a2c238884
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
Citations in the corpus
- Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making (2009, background): “Martimort (1996) and Martimort and Stole (1999) discuss this in more detail. type (incentive compatibility), the principals induce the same effort level from A for the reported type (coordination of effort levels), and each principal’s ξ and ti functions maximize her utility (in expectation with…”
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities (2003, unknown): “The idea that a party's trades with others can be viewed as her " type " on which she can be screened via a menu has been suggested in the context of the bidding game by Martimort and Stole (2002).”
- Common Agency and the Revelation Principle (2001, background): “For example, Martimort and Stole (1999a) consider an environment similar to the one in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) in which a single agent produces output for two different principals.”
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case (2001, background): “We do not address the second case, which is studied by Epstein and Peters (1996) and Martimort and Stole (1999). the agent anticipates this, he may realize that truthfully reporting his private information is disadvantageous for him.”