Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors?

By Jeffery Abarbanell, Reuven Lehavy. 2003

239 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/908d8cad9ab82e80f26066462faa5874a1165418

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Citations in the corpus

Earnings management or forecast guidance to meet analyst expectations? (2009, unknown): “Bartov et al. (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that firms that meet analyst expectations earn a market reward that is positively associated with future performance. Doyle et al. (2006) show that this market reward is robust to other risk factors and previously documented market anomalies”
Determinants of Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements (2001, unknown): “The core result may be due to analysts excluding certain one-time (non-core) items from their forecasts (e.g., Philbrick and Ricks, 1991; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003).”
Analysts' Conflict of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecasts (2007, unknown): “Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) find that firms which are more sensitive to earnings news (as proxied by a buy recommendation from analysts) are more likely to manage earnings to beat estimates.”
The Quality of Analysts ’ Cash Flow Forecasts (2008, unknown): “In contrast, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003a, 2003b) conclude that analysts either do not anticipate earnings management or they choose to exclude the managed earnings component from their forecasts.”
The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO Equity Compensation (2007, background): “…maintain increasing earnings patterns (Barth, Elliot, and Finn, 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999) and (2) pressure to meet analyst expectations (Burgstahler and Eames, 1999; Degeorge et al., 1999; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002).”
Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role of Reported Earnings in Explaining Apparent Bias and Over/Underreaction in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts (2003, unknown): “…on the grounds that the disproportional impact of the extreme tail makes it difficult detect general tendencies, or that such ‘‘errors’’ may not accurately reflect factors relevant to analysts’ objective functions (see, e.g., Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003b; Gu and Wu, 2003; Keane and Runkle, 1998).”
Performance, Growth and Earnings Management (2006, background): “Our paper also relates to Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), Fischer and Stocken (2004), and Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). Fischer and Verrecchia study the relation between earnings management and value relevance of reported earnings. Fischer and Stocken focus on the influence of the speculator’s inform”
Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators (2000, background): “Abarbanell and Lehavy (1999) argue that capital market incentives actually help explain the mixed evidence from contracting studies.”
Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts* (2004, background): “Baber and Kang (2002) show that rounding induced by I/B/E/S split adjustments can result in misclassifying whether a firm just beats or just misses the consensus analysts’ forecasts.”
Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, background): “Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) and Burgstahler and Eames (2003) suggest that analysts do not detect/anticipate earnings management to meet or beat targets, although an alternative explanation for these findings is that the complicated incentives of analysts cause them to ignore earnings management…”