Foundations of Human Sociality - Economic Experiments and Ethnographic: Evidence From Fifteen Small-Scale Societies
By Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis. 2004
1,438 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8f5603f1234d0b745e436273dcb023af9aff54e4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Simon Gächter
- Ernst Fehr
- Magnus Johannesson
- Benedikt Herrmann
- John A. List
- Charles Bellemare
- Sabine Kröger
- A. Barr
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Simon Gächter
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Benedikt Herrmann
- Magnus Johannesson
- John A. List
- Tore Ellingsen
- Joseph Henrich
In Sociology and Political Science
- Alex Mesoudi
- Joseph Henrich
- Ernst Fehr
- Kevin N. Laland
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Simon Gächter
- Benedikt Herrmann
- Peter J. Richerson
Citations in the corpus
- On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games (2007, background): “of the empirical results is echoed in Henrich et al.’s (2004) abstract: “Over the past decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus, with hundreds of experiments that have suggested that people care not only about their own mate”
- Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore (2009, background): “The first player acts as a firm which has the option of initiating a corrupt act by offering a bribe to a government official in order to increase 7 See, for example, Carpenter and Cardenas (2004), Croson and Buchan (1999), Roth et al. (1991) and Henrich et al. (2004).”
- Roots of Human Sociality (2006, background): “Moreover, experiments have been conducted in a number of small scale non-Western societies, and although there is much cultural variation, nowhere are people purely selfish (Henrich et al. 2004).”
- The influence of cultural framing on play in the trust game: A maasai example (2007, methodology): “A slight modification of the game is to give both players equal initial endowments (Barr, 2004; Lesorogol, unpublished data).”
- Evolution and Human Behavior (2002, background): “…of a broader and ongoing interdisciplinary efforts at developing an understanding human psychology and behavior that is more reflective of human diversity on the planet (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2005; Henrich et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Rozin, 2001; Shweder, 1990).”
- Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “The findings of this line of work, especially those carried out among small-scale tribal societies, as in Henrich et al. (2004) or Efferson et al. (2010), will likely provide valuable clues to human evolutionary processes.”
- MEASURING INEQUITY AVERSION IN A HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION USING EXPERIMENTAL DECISIONS AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES (2008, background): “Plateau response behavior in the ultimatum game has been reported by Huck (1999), Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2003), Tracer (2004), Bahry and Wilson (2006), and Hennig-Schmidt, Li and Yang (2008).11 These studies indicated that broad subject pools and the presence of strong social norms are the most…”
- Collective Action in Action: Prosocial Behavior in and out of the Laboratory (2008, background): “…about fairness, division rules, and punitive sentiment in the context of these games, with inferences made concerning species-typical cognitive design (Hoffman et al. 1998), cross-cultural norm variation (Henrich et al. 2004), and models of cooperation (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Henrich 2004).”
- Experimental economics: Where next? (2010, background): “However , as in Henrich et al (2004), it is common in behavioral economics to proceed as though the optimizing paradigm implies backward induction.”