Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance
By Wei Li, Victor Abiad. Social Science Research Network, 2009
2,957 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Why are some countries much richer than others? This technical note proposes a framework to begin answering this question. The first part identifies inefficient institutions as the root cause of the economic differences between societies. The second part analyzes how these institutions change. And the final part suggests how lessons from this institutional framework can be applied.
Subfields: Finance, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8eb02aeacc910d5e9cd151e27f27a51d129be15a
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In Finance
- K. Meyer
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In Sociology and Political Science
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Citations in the corpus
- Moving to a New Global Competitiveness Index (2008, neutral): “24 North 1990.”
- Asian Business Systems: Institutional Comparison, Clusters, and Implications for Varieties of Capitalism and Business Systems Theory (2013, methodology): “Not expressed in any single variable but pervading all of Asia and influencing most if not all aspects of Table 2 is a strong element of informality, which we define as reliance on informal (uncodified) institutions such as unwritten norms, conventions, or codes of behavior (cf. North, 1990).”
- Grounding Supply Chain Management in Resource‐Advantage Theory: In Defense of a Resource‐Based View of the Firm (2012, background): “competitive processes work (to, for example, foster productivity and economic growth) is significantly influenced by five environmental factors: the societal resources on which organizations draw, the societal institutions that form the ‘‘rules of the game’’ (North 1990), the actions of competitors ”
- Provision of electricity to African households: The importance of democracy and institutional quality (2015, background): “…fair and predictable rules facilitate economic and social interactions), and the presence or absence of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain (Gupta et al., 2000; Holmberg et al., 2009; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Mauro, 1998; North, 1990; Nye, 1967).”
- Wage Bargaining Institutions – from crisis to crisis (2013, neutral): “ Institutions are commonly understood as rules, norms or contracts (North 1990: 3), as social constructions “that cannot be changed instantaneously or easily” (Mahoney 2000:512).”
- Justice and flood risk management: reflecting on different approaches to distribute and allocate flood risk management in Europe (2016, background): “The distribution principle relies on the freedom of choices and the invisible hand of the market, whereas the role of the state is to define rules for individual action (Ostrom 1986; North 1990).”
- Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral-Dependent Development in Botswana (2009, positive): “Institutional approaches link policy choices to state and other institutional characteristics (North, 1990; Pierson, 2004).”
- Assessing the relationships between human capital, innovation and technology adoption: Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa (2017, background): “Accordingly, it remains unclear whether these findings will hold in an institutional environment of developing economies, where the “rules of the game” are often uncertain (North, 1990; Radjou et al., 2012; George et al., 2012).”
- Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism (2014, background): “North (1990; 2000) emphasizes the importance of informal institutions such as religion, customs, tradition, and norms, although they are often non-calculative and spontaneous.”
- An exploration of the relationship between country of origin (COE) and the internationalization-performance paradigm (2007, background): “reporting a U-shaped (or inverted-U) relationship: Capar/Kotabe (2003), Daniels/Bracker (1989), Geringer/Beamish/daCosta (1989), Ruigrok/Wagner (2003), Sullivan (1994b), Hitt/Hoskisson/ Kim (1997), Gomes/Ramaswamy (1999), Lu/Beamish (2001), Mauri/Sambharya (2001), and Ruigrok/Wagner (2003); and Stud”
- Exporting and innovating among emerging market firms: The moderating role of institutional development (2017, background): “Institutional Development as a Resource Institutions can be regarded as constraints devised to structure interaction among social entities (North, 1990).”
- Undesired reinforcement of harmful ‘self-evident truths’ concerning the implementation of wind power (2012, background): “Institutions are defined as mutually reinforcing patterns of behavior and thinking of societal actors, as reflected in formal and informal rules, norms and procedures (North, 1990).”