The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

By S. Dutta, Frank Gigler. 2002

162 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8e28796c3f0fb4dcb9c1b929cc0fb6f4801c8e77

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Gerald J. Lobo
2. Albert H. C. Tsang
3. Xiangang Xin
4. Volker Laux
5. Yuyan Guan

In Finance

1. Gerald J. Lobo
2. Albert H. C. Tsang
3. Xiangang Xin
4. Volker Laux
5. Yuyan Guan

In Strategy and Management

1. Xiangang Xin
2. Volker Laux
3. Yuyan Guan
4. Gerald J. Lobo
5. Albert H. C. Tsang

Citations in the corpus

• Stock Option Vesting Conditions, CEO Turnover, and Myopic Investment (2012, methodology): “UCEO = (s1(1 I) + a1) p (s2I + a2) X2 (8)”
• Societal Trust and Management Earnings Forecasts (2020, background): “For example, Dutta and Gigler (2002) argue that providing earnings forecasts voluntarily could prevent managers from earnings manipulation.”
• Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework (2008, unknown): “behind this behavior is consistent with an analytical model by Dutta and Gigler (2002) who show”
• Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management (2009, unknown): “The connection between earnings management and CEO will have an incentive to manipulate current earnings at the expense of future earnings if he has a shorter time horizon than shareholders (Feltham and Xie (1994), Dutta and Gigler (2002)).”