Contrastive and counterfactual reasoning in causal judgment.

By Ann L. McGill, Jill Klein. 1993

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Citations in the corpus

Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences (2017, background): “to cause C —, whereas in contrastive explanation, the counterfactuals are hypothetical outcomes — that is, a counterfactual to event E [127].”
A survey of algorithmic recourse: definitions, formulations, solutions, and prospects (2020, background): “Viewed in this manner, both contrastive explanations and consequential recommendations can be classified as a counter-factual [121], in that each considers the alteration of an entity in the history of the event P, where P is the undesired model output.”
A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021, background): “In contrast, McGill and Klein distinguished contrastive reasoning from its counterfactual counterpart [42].”
Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations (2006, background): “…on the contrast between reality and a counterfactual alternative (e.g., Hume, 1739/ 1978; Lewis, 1973; Mackie, 1974; Mill, 1843/1967) and social psychologists have suggested close links between counterfactual thoughts and causal attribution (e.g., Hilton, 1990; Lipe, 1991; McGill & Klein, 1993).”
Aligning Faithful Interpretations with their Social Attribution (2020, background): “9Selecting the foil, or selecting what to explain, is a difficult and interesting problem even in philosophical literature (Hesslow, 1988; Mcgill and Klein, 1993; Chin-Parker and Cantelon, 2017).”
Judgment dissociation theory: an analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual, and covariational reasoning. (2003, background): “…information when asked to judge the magnitude of a causal relation show that people assign greater weight to cases in which the proposed cause is present rather than absent (Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Cheng, 1997; Kao & Wasserman, 1993; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; McGill, 1998; McGill & Klein, 1993).”
Counterfactual thinking and ascriptions of cause and preventability. (1996, background): “Over the past decade, many researchers (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Hilton, 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Lipe, 1991; McGilI, 1989, 1990; McGill & Klein, 1993; Roese & Olson, 1995a; Wells & Gavanski, 1989) have posited that causal ascriptions depend in a significant way on counterfactual thinking .”