Judgment dissociation theory: an analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual, and covariational reasoning.

By David R. Mandel. 2003

116 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, General Decision Sciences

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Citations in the corpus

Explanation in Human-AI Systems: A Literature Meta-Review, Synopsis of Key Ideas and Publications, and Bibliography for Explainable AI (2019, background): “a,b), Hilton, McClure and Slugoski (2005); Hitchcock (2003); Hitchcock and Woodward (2003); Hoffman, et al., (2014); Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2010); Kim, Khanna, and Koyejo (2016); Lipton, (1990); Mandel (2003a,b), McCloy and Byrne (2000); and Thompson and Byrne (2002). Mandel et al (2011) and Ma”
Selecting explanations from causal chains: Do statistical principles explain preferences for voluntary causes? (2009, background): “Attribution research has been criticised for restricting its scope to simple causal structures (Kelley, 1983) and we seek below to build on studies of how explanations are selected from causal chains (e.g. Alicke, 1991; Brewer, 1977; Brickman, Ryan, & Wortman, 1975; Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Fincham ”
From counterfactual simulation to causal judgment (2014, background): “There is a rich literature on causal attribution which discusses the tension between counterfactual (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and actualist determinants (e.g. Mandel, 2003) of people's causal judgments.”
Intuitive Theories (2020, background): “Sufficient-cause Sufficiency is often discussed alongside necessity as one of the fundamental aspects of causation (e.g. Downing, Sternberg, & Ross, 1985; Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, Hewstone, & Fincham, 1983; Mackie, 1974; Mandel, 2003; Pearl, 1999; Woodward, 2006).”
Causal-explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. (2010, background): “Goal-directed human behavior is a gold standard for equifinality – and is the only case Heider identifies with personal causation – but artifacts and biological adaptations that support teleological explanations may also promote ‘‘mechanism-independent” reasoning.”
Judgments of cause and blame: the effects of intentionality and foreseeability. (2008, background): “Attributions in causal chains have received some attention in the literature (Mandel, 2003; Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990; N’gbala and Branscombe, 1995; Spellman, 1997; Vinokur & Ajzen, 1982), but the role of factors such as intentionality and foreseeability have not been explored in any depth.”
Depression, Control, and Counterfactual Thinking: Functional for Whom? (2006, background): “Causal ascriptions, on the other hand, tend to focus on sufficient (and not necessarily controllable) antecedents that played a critical role in how the actual outcome of an event came about (Mandel, 2003).”
The role of prescriptive norms and knowledge in children's and adults' causal selection. (2016, background): “…them, whether they represent the presence or absence of an event, the type of the underlying causal relation, or their relationship to norms (see, e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Lombrozo, 2010; Mandel, 2003; Roese, 1997; Spellman & Kincannon, 2001; Wells & Gavanski, 1989).”