The Value of Local Political Connections in a Low-Corruption Environment

By Mario Daniele Amore, Morten Bennedsen. 2013

400 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c60f9faa536ec28d78ddd5942efb13f44b4c5df2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Antoinette Schoar
2. David Thesmar
3. Camila C. Pereira
4. Jared D. Smith
5. Francis Kramarz
6. Marianne Bertrand
7. Xavier Giroud
8. Nicholas Bloom

In Strategy and Management

1. Antoinette Schoar
2. Peng Zhou
3. Camila C. Pereira
4. Jared D. Smith
5. Francis Kramarz
6. Marianne Bertrand
7. David Thesmar

Citations in the corpus

• US political corruption and firm financial policies (2016, background): “This paper contributes to the within-country literature in a spirit similar to Amore and Bennedsen (2013), who examine the value of political connections in another country with low corruption, Denmark.”
• The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States (2016, neutral): “and Amore and Bennedsen (2013) find value in family connections to”
• The Cost of Political Connections (2018, positive): “1 More recent papers have shown that, even in developed countries, access to political networks can affect firm outcomes; see Sapienza (2004), Amore and Bennedsen (2013), Adelino and Dinç (2014), and Schoenherr (2018).”
• Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, neutral): “However, research has shown that there are significant gains in political connections in countries with strong institutions (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013).”
• Political connections, government subsidies and firm financial performance: Evidence from renewable energy manufacturing in China (2014, background): “The estimates are consistent with an elasticity of firm performance to political power [9].”
• Political Connections and Allocative Distortions (2015, neutral): “…Jayachandran (2006), Faccio (2006), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Bunkanawanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), Faccio and Parsley (2009), Goldman et al. (2009), Cooper et al. (2010), Amore and Bennedsen (2013), Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak and Mitton (2016), Acemoglu et al. (2015), Akey (2015).”
• Textual analysis in finance (2019, background): “We have evidence that there is a positive effect in companies that keep political connections (Fisman, 2001; Amore and Bennedsen, 2013; Wang, 2015), and hence companies have incentives to pay bribes for receiving favors.”