Ownership Concentration and Executive Compensation in Closely Held Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong

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Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding (2009, background): “Third, controlling shareholders who are also directors of the firms can expropriate minority shareholders by setting their own compensation at above-market levels unjustified by performance or effort (Cheung et al., 2005).”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “This argument has been made both in the context of inside blockholders (Cheung et al., 2005) and professional managers (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004).”
Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies (2007, background): “Additionally, Cheung et al. (2005) analyze a sample of 412 Hong Kong firms and argue that CEOs with large share ownership may complement their cash compensation with dividend income.”
Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China (2011, result): “These results are consistent with the findings of Chung and Pruitt (1996), Cheung et al. (2005) and Chen (2006), and support H1a and H1b as executive remuneration is positively related to structural power and political power.”