Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market
By Ernesto Calvo, M. V. Murillo. 2004
683 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/888a3ab168921e90784116664adfb1290e15bb0e
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In Political Science and International Relations
- Thierry Verdier
- James A. Robinson
- C. Gervasoni
- Daron Acemoglu
- Elias Papaioannou
- T. Dunning
- E. Stam
- K. Morrison
Citations in the corpus
- The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness (2011, neutral): “Finally, development partners should anticipate that different parties are not likely to be equally concerned by the threats that decentralization poses to clientelism because parties in a given country are not equally dependent on clientelistic exchanges (Calvo and Murillo 2004).”
- A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces (2010, methodology): “49 Calvo and Murillo 2004; Remmer 2007.”
- Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994 (2008, neutral): “Results identify patterns of partisan-political distributive politics in nations as diverse as Albania (Case 2001), Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Porto and Sanguinetti 2001), Australia (Denemark 2000; Worthington and Dollery 1998), Brazil (Ames 2001), Canada (Kneebone and McKenzie 2001),…”
- Beyond Clientelism (2008, neutral): “Considerable debate exists on whether clientelist parties target swing voters (Dahlberg & Johanson, 2002; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Schady, 2000; Stokes, 2005) or core supporters (Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, & Magaloni, 2006; Magaloni, 2006).”
- The Political Economy of Clientelism (2002, background): “(2001) have argued that as much as half of the wage bill of the public sector in the south of Italy can be seen as pure redistribution, and many studies have found that the size of the public sector measured in terms of employment is greater when there is more clientelism (e.g., Gimpleson and Treism”