The Political Economy of Clientelism
By James A. Robinson, Thierry Verdier. 2002
663 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bb7c3023c02fd694d7d698fbcb36c8c77a72904d
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Anke Hoeffler
- Paul Collier
- Emanuele Colonnelli
- Edoardo Teso
- M. Prem
- F. van der ploeg
- Eoin F. McGuirk
- S. Bhattacharyya
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations (2020, background): “The theoretical literature on patronage has emphasized how redistribution through public sector jobs emerges as a credible way of rewarding clients since it solves the political-commitment problem between the client and the patron (Robinson and Verdier, 2013).”
- Do Political Connections Buffer Firms from or Bind Firms to the Government? A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms (2016, neutral): “On the other hand, binding effects has also been found in a wide range of contexts (Choi and Thum 2009, Robinson and Verdier 2013).”
- Clientelism and Social Funds: Evidence from Chávez's Misiones (2007, neutral): “For low-income voters, a unit increase in welfare provides a higher marginal utility than for citizens with higher income (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Robinson and Verdier 2003; Calvo and Murillo 2004).”