A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces

By C. Gervasoni. 2010

357 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/831f5bc2006fdc83ef639426aae9109101486693

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government (2013, background): “In defining transfers as windfalls, I follow on Gervasoni (2010), who argues that central transfers are windfalls for poor subnational governments because they are far bigger than what they could obtain through their own taxing efforts.”
The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review (2020, neutral): “…including in the US (Goldberg, Wibbels and Mvukiyehe, 2008; Wolfers, 2009), Brazil (Brollo et al., 2013; Monteiro and Ferraz, 2010), and Argentina (Gervasoni, 2010) all of which find that oil windfalls (or in the Brollo et al. and Gervasoni studies, windfall-like federal transfers) tend to…”
State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature† (2016, background): “…before Putin’s centralization of power36--broadly similar accounts of rent extraction by provincial politicians in Argentina are available in Gervasoni (2010) ; or (b) if it accentuates regional inequality on account of varying local endowments and institutions and richer areas having…”
The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels (2015, background): “Subnational studies have shown that oil rents assist elected officials to prolong their stay in power through generous redistribution (irrespective of the quality of the services they provide; see Goldberg et al., 2008, for the US and Gervasoni, 2010a, 2010b for Argentina).”
Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China (2017, neutral): “These fiscal ‘rents’ promote opportunistic spending, and are used carelessly to boost electoral support (Rodden 2002) or invested in repressive apparatuses to keep out political opponents (Gervasoni 2010, 308-309).”
Decentralization and governance: a special issue of World Development, 2013 (2014, background): “…papers that follow we use rich, multilayered evidence from Argentina, China and Mexico to push the theory of accountability and corruption away from these static intuitions, towards a deeper understanding of the dynamic incentives that operate across fiscal and political relations in a federal…”