Lectures on Antitrust Economics
By M. Whinston. 2006
291 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/87d838d82fc68b40a6bcef80d57c76318781ca39
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Andrew Sweeting
- Allan Collard-Wexler
- Robert Clark
- Ambarish Chandra
- Jean-François Houde
- Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
- Martin Pesendorfer
Citations in the corpus
- Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case (2013, background): “This is consistent with Whinston (2008) who points out that if explicit communication serves a purpose it must be via equilibrium selection since the set of outcomes sustainable outcomes is identified by subgame perfection whether collusion is tacit or explicit.”
- The effects of mergers on product positioning: evidence from the music radio industry (2010, background): “My results can therefore help to explain why models that treat product locations as fixed often do poorly at predicting how prices change after mergers (Peters, 2006; Whinston, 2006; Ashenfelter and Hosken, 2008) and why competitors may choose to lobby an antitrust authority to prohibit a merger eve”
- Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry (2008, background): “Whinston (2006) discusses both the theoretical and empirical evidence concerning the effect of horizontal mergers.”
- fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust (2009, unknown): “As argued by Whinston (2006), the relationship between communication in cartels and prices is not yet fully understood, hence the presumption that reduced cartel formation feeds back into lower prices and higher welfare cannot be taken entirely for granted.”