The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation

By Siwan Anderson, J. Baland. 2000

595 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies, Urban Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/876200b4300505b02750376a49cdc8216e6b2413

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Citations in the corpus

Gender Differences in Preferences, Intra-Household Externalities, and Low Demand for Improved Cookstoves (2013, background): “…offered by a product delivery rather than more fungible cash is valuable to women, possibly because they are unable to resist external demands on their income from either their spouse or from others (Anderson & Baland, 2002; Duflo, 2003; de Mel et al., 2009; Brune et al., 2011; Somville, 2011).”
Female Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines (2010, unknown): “Indeed, the literature on household savings, and on informal savings devices in particular, has emphasized motivations for both reasons (Anderson & Baland, 2002; Gugerty, 2007).”
Women Empowerment and Economic Development (2012, background): “Anderson and Baland (2002) argue, for example, that the rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) popular especially among women in many part of Africa are primarily a way for women to keep savings away from their husbands.”
The Handbook of Microfinance (2011, background): “You can't save alone: Commitment in rotating savings and credit assoc1at10u5 m Kenya.”
Why Don’t the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments. (2013, unknown): “The reason for this is that poor health is very common in Kenya (as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa), and lack of cash is commonly reported by households as a major barrier to health investments.”
Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon (2011, background): “1980). Anderson and Baland (2002) for example show that the need to protect savings from”
Limited insurance within the household: evidence from a field experiment in Kenya (2008, unknown): “(2) Yt = rYt 1 + wmHmt + wfHft + Smt + Sft p1t(cmt + cft) p2tCt”
Extended Family and Kinship Networks: Economic Insights and Evolutionary Directions (2008, background): “We first probably explains why ROSCAs are rather formal, with clearly defined rules and obligations (e.g. Aryeetey and Udry 1997, Anderson and Baland 2002).”
Families in Macroeconomics (2016, unknown): “When given the option, people often prefer to put money into private (and possibly secret) accounts.apHoel (2015) finds in Kenyan data that 31% of people say their spouse was not aware of any income they had received the preceding week. an See in particular Mazzocco (2007) and Voena (2015). ao For e”
Who Wears the Pants? Gender Identity Norms and Intrahousehold Financial Decision‐Making (2017, unknown): “Examples include the work of Anderson and Baland (2002) and Ashraf (2009), who examine household savings in Kenya and the Philippines, respectively.”
The Persistent Power of Behavioral Change: Long-Run Impacts of Temporary Savings Subsidies for the Poor (2018, background): “This could be particularly important if resources kept at home are “taxed” away by other members of the community or household (Platteau 2000; Anderson and Baland 2002; Jakiela and Ozier 2016).31 Recall that all couples opened at least one bank account as part of the experiment and bank accounts…”
A Dark Side of Social Capital? Kinship, Consumption, and Savings (2011, background): “We have also varied the sub-categories of savings to be included in our overall savings variable to reflect that some savings forms are more liquid and accessible to kin members than others – Anderson and Baland (2002) suggest that stokvel may be used to protect savings from others.”
Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know? (2013, background): “Turning to the issue of controlling the influence of others on consumption and savings, Anderson & Baland (2002) make the case that women in Kibera, Kenya, join rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) to protect their savings from their husbands.16 To support this narrative, the authors…”