Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon

By J. Baland, C. Guirkinger, C. Mali. Economic development and cultural change, 2011

212 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7fbbe54e9716b43a6447407724f28b8ff3d1e00a

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Citations in the corpus

Customary Norms, Inheritance, and Human Capital: Evidence from a Reform of the Matrilineal System in Ghana (2014, methodology): “We run a regression similar to (2), where eduitr is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual is currently attending school and zero otherwise.”
Why Don’t the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments. (2013, background): “While present-biased people may realize the need to commit money to savings and be interested in a commitment device, actually putting money into the lockbox itself requires an act of self-control, as discussed in Ashraf et al. (2006a) and Banerjee and Duflo (2011).”
Social capital, risk preference and adoption of improved farm land management practices in Ethiopia (2015, background): “We hypothesize that households with a relatively large number of relatives are less likely to adopt new technologies due to low incentives for collective sharing of benefits from adoption (Baland et al., 2011; Di Falco and Bulte, 2013).”
Microenterprise growth and the flypaper effect: Evidence from a randomized experiment in Ghana (2014, background): “8E.g. Duflo and Udry (2004), Charlier (1999), di Falco and Bulte (2009), Baland et al (2011), and Jakiela and Ozier (2012).”
Revising Commitments: Field Evidence on the Adjustment of Prior Choices (2012, unknown): “9 See, e.g., Platteau (2000), Maranz (2001), Anderson and Baland (2002), Ligon et al (2002), Hoff and Sen (2006), Ashraf (2009), Baland et al. (2011), Jakiela and Ozier (2011) and Schaner (2015).”
A Dark Side of Social Capital? Kinship, Consumption, and Savings (2011, background): “Barr et al. (2008) consider endogenous formation of risk sharing groups in an economic experiment and also conclude ‘genetically related individuals tend to distrust one another and so do not group when enforcement depends on intrinsic motivations alone’.”
Individualism–collectivism, governance and economic development (2015, unknown): “This work is inspired by Banfield's (1958) argument that at the heart of the relative underdevelopment of Southern Italy is 'amoral familism' or the tendency of individuals to maximize the material advantage of the nuclear family and assume that others will do the same.”