Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States
By Stephen Ansolabehere, A. Gerber, J. Snyder. American Political Science Review, 2002
216 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/86f8777ca378cf8c5bbb858d0ce0055c52de9b5f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Neil Malhotra
- Andrew J. Healy
- Stuti Khemani
- Brian G. Knight
- A. Banful
- Scott Ashworth
- Feng Xie
- David M Levinson
In Political Science and International Relations
- Andrew J. Healy
- Neil Malhotra
- Stuti Khemani
- Brian G. Knight
- A. Banful
- Scott Ashworth
- David M Levinson
- Enrico Moretti
Citations in the corpus
- Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures (2006, unknown): “At the state level, we know of only one study that has estimated e®ects of party control on the distribution of public funds (Ansolabehere et al., 2002).”
- Random Events, Economic Losses, and Retrospective Voting: Implications for Democratic Competence (2010, methodology): “To address the large amount of skewness in tornado damage and fatalities, we follow other authors (e.g., Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002) and convert these measures into logarithms.”
- Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress* (2008, background): “Ansolabehere et al. (2002) find that Baker v. Carr, which required that state legislative districts be re-apportioned every ten years, significantly altered the flow of state transfers to county 1 These data contain federal spending by Congressional districts, although the author aggregates up to…”
- Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India (2007, background): “Regions with higher political representation per capita tend to receive greater government spending per capita (Wright, 1974; Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001; Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder, 2002).”