Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement

By Helen Bernhard, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher. 2006

420 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Political Science and International Relations, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/85eb925a2a48416a0f921833f8ae5c63e13b2ca6

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Citations in the corpus

Social Identity and Preferences Over Redistribution (2010, positive): “…and Gagnon (2001)].2 Caring about one s group is also consistent with behavior in strategic bargaining, dictator, and prisoner s dilemma games [Bernhard et al. (2006), Charness et al. (2007), Chen and Li (2008), Fowler and Kam (2007), and Goette et al. (2006)], and in public goods experiments…”
Market inefficiencies and the adoption of agricultural technologies in developing countries 1 (2013, background): “Theories to explain other-regarding behavior include the warm glow from altruistic decisions (e.g. Andreoni 1990), fairness or reciprocity (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999), reputational or dynamic considerations (e.g. Bénabou and Tirole 2003), and social norms (e.g. Bernhard et al. 2006).”
Evolution of parochial altruism by multilevel selection (2011, methodology): “Interactions resemble the experimental set-up of Bernhard et al. (2006a, 2006b), in which matching occurs with members of the own and other groups.”
Group Identity and Social Preferences (2009, background): “In a second experiment similar to Bernhard et al. (2006), they also find that third-party punishment is stronger when a violation affects an ingroup member as opposed to an outgroup member.”
The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups (2006, positive): “ This is consistent with Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006), who observe that third‐party punishers impose more deduction points on dictators who give low transfers if the potential recipient of the transfer is from the punisher’s own tribe.”
The Impact of Social Ties on Group Interactions: Evidence from Minimal Groups and Randomly Assigned Real Groups (2012, background): “This approach has a key advantage over using existing groups like ethnic groups or clans (see, e.g. Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Bernhard et al., 2006; Falk and Zehnder, 2006), which is that the random assignment to minimal groups allows making inferences about the causal effect of group membership.”